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N2 UNIVERSAL: A CASE STUDY OF AN NDA
The Sargenti endodontic technique has demonstrated an unequalled
success rate in millions of teeth. . .1
have saved thousands of teeth at an economical cost to the patients,
with predictable results and results that
have not demonstrated any pulpal or other tissue necrosis from
paraformaldehyde. {Dr. Emanuel Ploumis,
American Endodontic Society.
Substantial scientic and clinical evidence shows that
paraforinaldehyde-containing materials are cytotoxic
and cause irreversible damage to living systems. {Dr. N.J.
McDonald, Asst. Prof of Endodontics,
University of Maryland Dental School.
It is the FDA's responsibility to determine the legality of products
marketed for use in dentistry and to help
make sure they are safe and eective for their intended use. {Dr.
David Kessler, Commissioner of the
Food and Drug Administration.1
Food and drug law, like all areas of administrative law, is rife with tension among
countervailing principles. The Food and Drug Administration is charged with
protecting the health and safety of the American public. This mandate involves
competing considerations. First, the FDA must ensure that drug innovation is
promoted so that eective new treatments are introduced as quickly as possible
and at the lowest cost possible; but, FDA must also ensure that no drugs are
allowed to be marketed which may cause injury or death to a patient or which
are ineective in treating the disease for which claims are made. To allow
FDA to achieve this dicult mission, Congress and the courts have given the
Agency unprecedented discretion over private drug manufacturers and health
care practitioners. This bureaucratic discretion is in tension with our democratic
notions of due process and fairness that government should be restrained by pre-
existing rules and legal principles and that each person, or drug manufacturer,
should have the opportunity to participate in government actions which aect
a personal, professional or nancial interest.
On February 12, 1993, the Dental Products Panel of the Medical Devices
Advisory Committee reported to the Commissioner of the FDA that the clinical
studies and case histories submitted by N2
tDental Products Panel Meeting, Volume IL Dept. of Health and Human
Services, Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration, 8,
38, 40 (Feb. 12, 1993)[hereinafter Hearing Transcrij,f'J.
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Products Corporation in support of its NDA for N2 Universal did not meet
the Agency's standards for adequate and well-controlled studies and recom-
mended that new studies be required. This decision culminated a 10-year NDA
process for the manufacturer of the drug and represented another controver-
sial decision in a long-running and heated intra-professional battle over the use
of root canal resins containing paraformaldehyde. This paper will examine the
controversy over N2 Universal, focusing on the legal issues raised by its troubled
passage through the FDA regulatory process, and highlighting the competing
tensions of food and drug law as described above.
Endodontic Treatment: Gutta Percha vs. N2
N2 Universal is a root canal resin containing zinc-oxide, eugenol and 6.5%
paraformaldehyde. It is used as a disinfectant and cement in the endodontic
treatment of teeth. Endodontic treatment is performed on a tooth when it is
damaged by decay or loss of circulation. The treatment is designed to prevent
extraction of the tooth. It involves the removal of infected pulp from inside
the tooth's canals, disinfection of the canals to kill all bacteria and to prevent
future reinfection, and lling of the canal with a sealer which hardens into a
cement. Endodontic treatment is performed both by specialists, endodontists,
and general practitioners. The American Dental Association estimates that over
80% of endodontic services are performed by general practitioners.2
In the early 1970s, a controversy began to brew over the use of a new kind
of root canal resin, now called N2 Universal or N2. Endodontists use a resin
called gutta percha. It is a sealer consisting mostly of zinc-oxide and a small
amount of tree sap. It is currently classied as a Class I medical device. It
is not a disinfectant. Prior to lling the canal with gutta percha, endodon-
tists disinfect the root canals with a variety of chemicals, but most commonly,
sodium hypochloride (Clorox). Endodontic treatment using the gutta percha
ller requires several patient visits before the tooth may be sealed, because the
endodontist must disinfect the tooth several times to be sure that all bacteria
have been eliminated.
The new technique, known as the Sargenti technique, was developed by a
Swiss dentist, Dr. Sargenti, in the 1950s and is currently the treatment of choice
in Europe and Australia. It uses the N2
2Hearing Transcript at 54.
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root canal ller, which contains zinc-oxide, eugenol and 6.5% paraformalde-
hyde. The Sargenti technique does not require complete disinfection of the root
canals before the tooth may be lled, since the paraformaldehyde acts as a disin-
fectant within the ller. Thus, the Sargenti technique may usually be completed
in one visit, saving the patient time, pain and money. It is simpler than the
traditional technique and has thus become the preferred technique for a great
number of general practitioners in the United States.
Both techniques carry some risk of over-ll. An over-ll occurs when the den-
tist drills too far down the root and opens the tooth into the surrounding tissue.
In a successful root canal, there is no leakage into the surrounding tissue, and
the resin remains contained within the tooth. However, when an over-ll occurs,
the ller leaks into the tissue, causing pain and/or tissue damage. Originally,
traditional endodontists used only hand instruments to clean out the canals,
minimizing the risk of over-ll but also maximizing the time and pain required
to complete the root canal. Sargenti dentists use motorized devices, known as
giromatics, to mechanically clean out the root canals. Thus, the root canals
can be cleaned out and lled in one visit, but the risk of over-ll, particularly
for a dentist with limited experience in endodontic treatment, is higher. Today,
some traditional endodontists use giromatics in conjunction with gutta-percha,
and some general practitioners use hand instruments in conjunction with N2.
Thus, the issue, now, has become whether N2 represents a greater risk to the
patient in the event of an overll than gutta percha, although the controversy
began over the inherently riskier nature of the entire Sargenti technique.
Professional Turf War: Specialists vs. Generalists
When general practitioners began using N2, the endodontists began to com-
plain. In an article appearing in A~w~ii~ekin October 1975, the American
Association of Endodontists (AAE) claimed that the technique was downright
dangerous and stated that paraformaldehyde resembles embalming uid [andi
is highly damaging to tissues. AAE asserted that the Sargenti treatment was
leading to injuries to bone and oral tissues, sometimes resulting in the need for
plastic surgery to undo the damage, and leading to a growing number of mal-
practice suits. The Sargenti users rebutted by noting that the paste contains
only small amounts of potentially toxic substances [whichi
3803-8543-9
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remain conned to the root canal and that the gutta-percha used by [en-
dodontistsj accounts for the postoperative pain associated with conventional
treatment, while there is rarely if ever any pain experienced in the Sargenti
technique.3
The Nei~week article was the tip of the iceberg in a battle between the spe-
cialists and general practitioners which is still raging. Since this article, others
have appeared maligning the use of the Sargenti technique. In 1990, ABC's
Prime Time Live devoted a sensationalistic segment to the Sargenti technique,
charging that this stu of nightmares only benets the dentist, is highly toxic
and that, across the country people have suered serious and irreversible dam-
age from Sargenti Paste. '~ In 1991, the Kentucky Courier-Journal featured an
article claiming that the Sargenti technique is a risky, moneymaking procedure
that sacrices safety for speed often resulting in tissue damage or long-term
injury from paraformaldehyde. ~
In December 1975, Chairman Fountain (D-N.C.) of the House Investigating
Subcommittee held a hearing on FDA's classication of N2, a new drug which
presents a health hazard and should be banned.6 Chairman Fountain demanded
that FDA regulate N2 as a drug. The American Endodontic Society (AES), an
association of general practitioners who use the Sargenti technique, claim that
this hearing was held at the instigation of the endodontists, who began to fear
that they would lose their livelihoods if general practitioners were able to do
root canals more quickly and at less cost. AES and other users of N2 believe
the controversy over the Sargenti technique is an economic turf war:
We believe that this situation has evolved over the years as an economic turf
war issue, where the endodontists desire to eliminate the inexpensive easily done
and eective N2 endodontic technique so that more patients will be referred to
their specialty. This action has been seen in a systematic combination of the
non-use of N2 in many dental schools, in textbooks and in pressure exerted
on journal editors not to publish N2 research that is positive; the creation of
malpractice hit teams who will testify against N2 treatment in civil cases; and
in direct retaliation to endodontists who favor or are
3Matt Clark, At the Root of the Trouble, NEwswrn, Oct. 6, 1975, at
93.
4PRJMETIME LIVE, ABC News, Transcript, Feb. 8, 1990.
5Bob Deite!, Dental Dilemma: Disputed Method for Root Canals
Fuels Crusade, THE COURTER-JOURNAL, March 5, 1991,
at lC.
6The PinkSheet, FDC REPORTS, March 8, 1993.
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neutral to the use of N2. This situation is unfortunate because valuable
research supporting the safety and benets of N2 is being diminished, and the
public is being discouraged from the benets of this very eective material.7
The endodontists adamantly disagree with this contention, claiming that it
is an issue of safety:
The judgment has been made that the risk inherent in the use of N2 or
paraformaldehyde-containing paste is, in fact, unnecessary and is an unwar-
ranted risk to patients because safe alternatives are available... Damage from
paraformaldehyde is permanent when it occurs. .. It has never been a turf bat-
tle. It is purely an issue of safety. In order to protect the public the FDA must
reject this application and ban the use of all paraformaldehyde-containing root
canal lling materials or sealersA
In the face of this professional battle, FDA was required to make an un-
precedented decision{whether or not to approve the N2 root canal ller as a
drug.9
N2 Universal's NDA: A Chronology
In 1983, N2 Products Corporation led an NDA for N2 Universal.'0 The
NDA contained an
IND protocol for a clinical study, which was designed and approved by Dr.
James Mann, Director of
the FDA Division of Surgical and Dental Drug Products. The protocol called
for a clinical study of
100 root canals with follow-up verication of their success or failure and any
adverse reactions, using
a historical control.
In August 1986, Dr. Clarence Gilkes, FDA's Chief Dental Reviewing Of-
cer of FDA notied by telephone the President of N2 Products, Dr. Alvin
Artz, that all requirements of the clinical study had been fullled and that the
clinical section of the NDA was approved. In November 1986, FDA requested
additional chemistry data and stability tests for the active ingredients of N2.
In August 1987, an amendment to the NDA was led providing information on
the container and closure system to be used for the nished product. In June
1990, another amendment was led containing the chemistry and stability data
requested. In March 1991, the manufacturing plant was visited for a preap-
proval inspection. In September 1991, Dr. Paula Botstein, Director of Division
of Medical
7Hearing Transcript at 58 (statement of Dr. William Fentress, Amer-
ican Association of Forensic Dentists).
81d. at 53-55 (statement of Dr. Joseph Maggio, Former President,
American Association of Endodontists).
9FDA has never regulated a root canal resin or other similar dental product as
a device.
10The following chronology is based upon a report written by N2 Products at-
5torney, Mr. Charles Raubicheck, as it
appeared in the Spring 1993 Newsletter of the American Endodontic Society
and is veried by testimony presented at the
Dental Products Panel Hearing.
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Imaging, Surgical and Dental Drug Products and Deputy Director of the
Oce of Drug Evaluation, requested the submission of additional case histories
and further safety analysis of the clinical investigation. In April 1992, N2 Prod-
ucts led an amendment to the NDA, which contained 9,514 case histories and
a further safety analysis of the clinical data. In July 1992, Oscar Riggleman,
FDA' s chemist reviewing the NDA, indicated that the chemistry portion was
approved pending inspection of the raw material manufacturers.
In December 1992, N2 Products learned from Dr. Gilkes that the NDA was
being referred to the s Dental Products Advisory Panel for a recommendation on
approval of the clinical portion of the NDA. N2 Products was surprised by this
action, since they felt that Dr. Gilkes 1986 telephone approval constituted nal
FDA approval of the clinical portion of the NDA. N2's attorney, Mr. Charles
Raubicheck, repeatedly attempted to determine the position that FDA would
take at the Panel's hearing and to obtain copies of the questions which would be
put to the Panel regarding the clinical study. Three days prior to the hearing,
Mr. Raubicheck received a list of questions challenging the propriety of the
historical control in the protocol and the adequacy of the safety and eectiveness
evaluations in the clinical study and case histories.
After a day-long hearing, the Dental Products Panel unanimously agreed
that the clinical study submitted by N2 Products did not meet the Agency's
standards for an adequate and well-controlled study. In May 1993, the FDA
agreed to allow N2 Products to conduct an open eld study, which will allow
them to produce N2 and sell it at cost, as long as any dentist who buys it
participates in the study. This is presumably an open label INID which allows
general use of a drug not intended for life-threatening diseases to obtain addi-
tional information on safety and eectiveness and which are granted by FDA
on an ad hoc basis.'2 N2 Products is waiting for a protocol to be approved for
the open eld study and for a new clinical study.
11Telephone interview with Lois Artz, Board of Directors, N2 Products Cor-
poration (Jan. 21, 1994).
12PEI~ER BARTON Hurr & RIcHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG
LAW, 553, 557 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter Hutt casebook].
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The Dental Products Panel Decision
N2 Products and its related association, the American Endodontic Society,
feel that the Panel's decision was a travesty'3 and that the NDA has been han-
dled deplorably by FDA.'4 Many in the AES feel that FDA has been improperly
inuenced by the endodontists, who are better represented in the scientic and
academic community than the general practitioners. They are convinced that
the Panel's decision was made on political, not scientic, grounds. This raises
the following questions:
Was the Panel's decision correct? illegal? unfairly biased? Did FDA handle
N2's NDA improperly? FDA's Decision to Refer to the Dental Panel
Advisory committees are set up to provide FDA with information, interpre-
tation and advice which will supplement that generated internally and to give
FDA access to the highest level of scholarship in the scientic community, with
state-of-the-art knowledge from individuals in research or clinical practice.'5
They are commonly used by FDA to evaluate the adequacy of clinical studies.'6
When Dr. Botstein began serving as Deputy Director of the Oce of Drug
Evaluation in 1991, she apparently became concerned about the adequacy of
the clinical data in the NIDA, despite the fact that it was approved by other
regulators at FDA. She is neither a dentist nor an endodontist, so there is little
reason to question the integrity and good-intention of this decision. In fact, her
decision to refer her questions to the Panel was perfectly appropriate in this situ-
ation and preferable to denying or approving the NDA unilaterally. By referring
her questions to the Panel, she ensured that all interested parties would have
an opportunity for comment and that FDA would have expert advice before
making a nal decision on the NDA.
The Panel's Conclusion: Not an Adequate and Well-Controlled Study
'35ee, ~ N2U and the FDA...A Modem Day Fairy Tale, NEWSLE-
TrER OF THE AMERICAN ENDODONTIC SOCIETY, Spring 1993 at 3.
~ Letter from Charles J. Raubicheck, Attorney to N2 Products, to
Congressman John D. Dingell, Chauman,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, March
5, 1993 (We write to make an urgent request that you investigate the
FDA's truly deplorable handling of this NDA.).
15Use of Advisory Committees by the FDA. Statement of Commissioner
Alexander Schmidt, Hearings Before a
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations
(1974), Hu casebook at 1284.
t6Huttcasebookat 1285. See al~ 21 C.F.R. x14.160 etseq.
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The Panel was asked to evaluate the clinical data in the NDA for N2. In the
words of Dr.
Botstein:
We are asking you to evaluate the adequacy of the database that is in the
NDA .. database of basically two items, a clinical study of 109 teeth in 91
patients with a historical control group taken from the literature .. .IjandIJ
9,514 case histories which were not consecutive and were apparently selected
for successful Outcomes.'7
This essentially amounted to a request for a determination by the Panel
whether the N2 clinical study met the ecacy requirement of the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act). Section 505(d) of the FD&C Act states that
the FDA shall withhold approval of a new drug unless the sponsor provides
substantial evidence that the drug will have the eect it purports. Substan-
tial evidence is dened as adequate and well-controlled investigations, including
clinical investigations, by experts qualied by scientic training and experience
to evaluate the eectiveness of the drug involved. 18 Based upon the testimony
at the hearing and the documentation in the NDA, the Panel
determined that the substantial evidence standard had not been met and,
therefore, that the clinical study should not be approved.
The Panel made several conclusions:
(1) The clinical study was not adequate and well-controlled. The study pro-
tocol had not been properly documented. For example, only 8 out of 109 case
forms were signed, and criteria for a determination of successful treatment were
not stated. There was evidence that the cases were not completed or reported
consecutively, as required by the protocol. That is, instead of each dentist re-
porting on the rst ve root canals she did upon starting the study, the dentist
chose ve, non-consecutive and successful root canals and reported them.'9
(2) A historical control was inadequate for a study of eectiveness of root canal llers.
The Panel members felt that a simultaneous control could have been used and
that the historical control used in the study had a selection bias for successful
cases. 20
17Hearing Transcr4tat 117-118.
1821 U.S.C. x505(d).
'91d. at 179.
2014~at 181.
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(3) The criteria for eectiveness were not clearly dened in either the clinical study or the historical control.
The patient reports in the clinical study did not have an item-by-item identi-
cation of the outcome eects to be evaluated by the monitoring dentist. 21
(4) The eectiveness endpoints were not adequately collected or analyzed. The
Panel found a lack of information with regard to the endpoint, both the deni-
tion of the endpoint and the collected material, and the evidence collected was
sketchy and poorly documented.22
(5) Adverse eects had not been adequately collected. characterized or analyzed in the study or in the historical control.
Most of the historical controls have more of an anecdotal summary report of
things happening than detailed information.23
(6) The summary of the case histories did not provide controlled data on the eectiveness and safety of the N2 product.
Without the accompanying evidence of unsuccessful treatment, eectiveness and
safety cannot be determined. 24 The Panel felt that the case histories were se-
lected based upon success and that unsuccessful examples or adverse reactions
had been purposely excluded.
In sum, the Panel concluded that:
In the absence of knowing that these are either random or consecutive cases
in both the study and the historical controls so that there is not a selection
bias which simply selected the successful versus the non-successful cases. .. [the
Panel] has to say no.25
(1) Was the Panel's Decision Correct?
Although N2 Products feels that the Panel decision was a travesty, the de-
cision was correct. The N2 clinical study did not meet several of the FDA
regulatory requirements for adequate and well-controlled studies, as set out in
21 C.F.R. x 314.26. The requirements which were not met include, but are not
limited to, the following: (1) the method of assigning patients to treatment or
control groups minimize bias; (2) adequate measures are taken to minimize bias
on part of the observers and analysts of the data; (3) methods of assessment of
subjects' response are well-dened
211d at 184.
221d at 186.
at 192.
241~at 198.
at 200.
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and reliable; and (4) the study design permits a valid comparison with a
control to provide a quantitative assessment of drug eect.26 Thus, the Panel
had no choice but to conclude that the clinical study should not be approved.
However, even if the Panel's decision was correct according to the regula-
tions, N2 Products and the members of the AES were understandably frustrated
by the decision. In accordance with FDA procedure, the protocol followed by N2
Products in the clinical study was designed by FDA. The Panel noted that N2
Products had attempted in good faith to comply with the protocol.27 Thus, the
fault seems to lie with FDA for its failure to adopt an adequate protocol design.
This failure was exacerbated by FDA's failure to identify the problems with the
clinical study protocol much earlier in the NDA process. Since FDA has been
given sole responsibility for designing INi) protocols, it has an armative obli-
gation to identify problems in a protocol as they arise so that manufacturers are
not misled into wasting valuable time and resources on a awed NIDA. This is
particularly true where the manufacturer is small, has not had experience with
the FDA's regulatory process and is, therefore, unlikely to foresee and preempt
potential problems in a protocol. In this case, FDA's failures have led to ten
years of lost time and money for N2 Products, and to continued uncertainty
(and fear of malpractice liability) regarding the legality of the use of N2-like
compounds for the general practitioners who use the Sargenti technique.
(2) Was the Panel's Decision Legal?
*Alterjng an Approved NDA
N2 Products claims that the FDA acted in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner by changing the
rules in the middle of the game and reneging on an approved protocol.28 The
protocol established in
1983 called for one clinical study. In 1986, the FDA had seemingly approved
the study, when Dr.
Gilkes of the FDA informed N2 Products that the clinical portion of the
study was approved. By
1993, N2 Products had spent over ten years completing a protocol designed
by FDA and complying
26~ 21 C.F.R. x314.26.
27Hearmg Thanscript at 184 (I think it is very clear that the sponsors
feel they did what they were supposed to do.). kg., Hearing Transcript
at 175 (statement of Mr. Charles Raubicheck, N2 Products attorney).
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with other NDA requirements, only to be told by the Panel that the protocol
was inadequate and that the study would have to be redone.
While this may be unfair to the manufacturer, it is not illegal. Section 505(e)
of the FD&C Act empowers the Secretary to:
Withdraw approval of an application with respect to any drug.. . if, [inter
alia] (3) on the basis of new information before him with respect to such drug,
evaluated together with the evidence available to him when the application was
approved, that there is lack of substantial evidence that the drug will have the
eect it purports or is represented to have....
Although Section 505(e) is not entirely apposite, it demonstrates that the
FDA has legal authority to withdraw an NDA approval, ~i ~ny time. The
decision to give FDA this authority represents a value judgment that assurance
of public health and safety should take precedence over the economic costs to
a manufacturer who has pursued in good faith an ultimately rejected NDA
protocol. While this may make sense in terms of public protection, it may not
make sense in terms of overall public health. N2 Products and the dentists using
N2 claim that based on two decades of use of N2- like compounds that N2 is the
quickest, least painful and cheapest way to treat root canals and that it is equally
or more eective than other more traditional techniques. Even if it is not illegal
for FDA to change the rules in the middle of the game, it violates fundamental
principles of fairness and due process. Again, at the very least, FDA should
be open about any problems it has with an NI)A clinical study, immediately.
By being prompt with its concerns, FDA will at least aord manufacturers the
opportunity to address FDA's concerns or arrest the NDA and start over before
wasting more time and money.
*1993 Standards for a 1983 Protocol
During the hearing, the Panel expressed concerned about whether it was
legal or fair to evaluate a study designed in 1983 by 1993 standards. One Panel
member asked Dr. Botstein if they were to evaluate the study in the context of
what the investigators were told initially to do versus considerations of today.
29 Dr. Botstein replied unequivocally: We have to evaluate the data before
29Hearing Transcript at 173.
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us today. .. using the standard scientic standards of today.30 While this
may be legally correct, it is not necessarily correct from a policy standpoint.
FDA's drug approval process has been criticized for adding to the costs of
new drugs and for leading to drug-lag, i.e., delaying the marketing of important
new drugs.3' FDA's excessive focus on safety and eectiveness has resulted in
the average NDA taking from 7 to 13 years to be approved at a cost of $30 to
$50 million.32 Given that the NDA process now takes this long, it is bad policy
for the FDA to judge clinical study protocols designed early in the process by
the standards of science which exist at the end of the process. Allowing the
FDA this discretion gives them carte-blanche to disapprove an NIDA no matter
how scrupulously the manufacturer has followed the protocol, resulting in major
economic loss and delay in marketing of eective new drugs. This is particularly
true for a small company like N2 Products, which could be bankrupted by such
a reversal, and forced to abandon the NDA, thus depriving consumers of a
potentially eective and inexpensive new drug treatment.
In addition, FDA's risk aversion exacerbates the potential ill eects of this
kind of discretion. An FDA regulator will always be fearful of approving a new
drug based upon old science, since if the drug then has harmful consequences,
her career will be ruined.33 Giving regulators the discretion to reject an NDA
which was properly conducted under an old protocol because standards have
changed is too tempting to risk-averse regulators. While the FDA does need
to ensure public safety by applying the standards of state-of-the-art science, its
discretion to renege on approved protocols should be restricted by Congress or
agency regulations. This is particularly true for drugs which do not have life-
threatening or irreversibly injurious consequences, and for small manufacturers,
who may not have the resources to start an NDA over.
(3) Did FDA Handle N2's NDA Improperly?
301d. at 174.
3THutt casebookat 580-584.
at 514. These gures were calculated in 1980 and have increased
substantially since then.
~ Huft casebook at 582.
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N2 Products also claims that N2's NDA has been handled deplorably by the
FDA.34 Despite repeated requests, FDA refused to supply N2 Products with the
Agency's questions regarding the adequacy of the clinical study until three days
prior to the Panel Hearing. In addition, FDA lost all of the X-rays documenting
the results of the clinical study. Although not illegal, this is clearly unprofes-
sional and incompetent behavior, and N2 Products has a right to be incensed.
The FDA should strive harder to comply with the principles of due process by
informing manufacturers well in advance of Advisory Committee hearings of
the issues to be discussed. There is currently no regulation requiring advanced
notication of issues to be addressed at Advisory Committee hearings. Such a
regulation is clearly in order. In addition, FDA should be required to make repa-
rations for lost records and provide the manufacturer time to replicate them.
If replication is not possible, FDA should be required to take into considera-
tion its own misconduct as a mitigating factor in determining the adequacy of
the records supporting a clinical study. It is unclear if the X-rays would have
inuenced the Panel's decision. However, since one of the Panel's primary criti-
cisms of the study was improper documentation, the X-rays may have had some
impact on the decision. It is troubling and unfair that the manufacturer was
forced to pay the price of FDA's incompetence in this situation.
(4) Was the Advisory Committee Biased?
In addition to its frustration over FDA's change in position over its clini-
cal study and its outrage at the FDA's failure to notify it of the issues to be
addressed and at FDA's loss of the clinical study X-rays, N2 Products has al-
leged that the Panel was unfairly biased against N2.35 The Federal Advisory
Committee Act regulates the establishment and operations of committees ad-
vising Federal agencies.36 The FDA has adopted regulations interpreting the
Act which state that: An advisory committee... [shall] serve[] as a source of
independent expertise and advice rather than as a representative of or advocate
for any particular interest.37
34 ~e note 14, supra.
355ee, ~L. NEWSLETTER OF THE AMERICAN ENDODONTIC SOCI-
ETY, Spring 1993 at 2. (The decision of the Panel should
be disregarded. A new, carefully selected, non-prejudiced Panel
should be assembled....).
36Hutt casebook at 1286.
~~4l Fed. Reg. 52148 (Nov. 26, 1976).
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The composition of the Dental Products Panel may have violated this stan-
dard. The voting members of the Panel included: a general dentist, a professor
of dental medicine, a professor of pharmacology, the Dean of the University
of Washington Dental School, a professor of restorative dentistry, a professor of
oral medicine, a professor of endodontics and an orthopedic surgeon. Thus, four
of the eight panel members were from dental school faculties which, N2 Products
and the AES claim, are controlled and dominated by the specialists, who are
biased against N2. The FDA could have identied additional members of the
Panel with scientic backgrounds who were not dental school faculty members
to ensure an unbiased panel.
FDA should be more alert to situations where members of the health care
professions feel the FDA is being unduly inuenced by political considerations
and should take steps to address these concerns. Failure to do so increases public
concern over bureaucratic discretion and undermines public trust in FDA. As
the agency with the most unfettered discretion, FDA bears a special burden
to be scrupulously apolitical in making decisions such as this one. In addition,
since FDA depends, in large part, upon voluntary compliance from health care
practitioners with FDA regulations, it should be particularly careful to avoid
actions which undermine their trust. The Agency's ability to rely on voluntary
compliance will be threatened if it continues to ignore practitioners concerns
about politically biased decision-making.
In defense of the FDA, however, N2 Products failed to object to the com-
position of the Panel before or during the hearing and has not established by
concrete evidence that the dental school faculty members on the panel were,
per se, biased. In addition, it would be administratively impossible for FDA
to appoint a new panel each time a drug application involved intra-professional
conict. FDA did not clearly violate the letter of its regulations or the Federal
Advisory Committee Act in appointing the Panel members, but it could have
attempted to be more fair.
Is N2 Universal a Drug or Device?
The most perplexing issue in this case study is why N2 Universal is being
regulated as a drug rather than a device. Pursuant to the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976, FDA classied all medical devices at 21 C.F.R. Part 872.
Under these regulations, nearly all dental products are
15803-8543-9
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regulated as devices. For example, zinc oxide eugenol is Class I; gutta percha
is Class I; root canal resins not containing chloroform are Class II, and those
containing chloroform are Class 111.38 The Panel was also perplexed about why
N2 was being evaluated as a drug. One panelist asked a testifying witnesses if
he felt N2 was a drug or device, but was stopped by an FDA representative,
who informed him that: FDA is not here to state the reasons why this product
is a drug or device. A decision is made within FDA. ~ The issue arose later in
the hearing when a panelist stated, I have a point of confusion. It gets back to
the basic drug-device separation... I am confused about what the issues at hand
are. ~ Dr. Botstein responded:
Because the paraformaldehyde is in there and because the sponsor's draft
labeling talks about disinfectant, this is regarded as a drug. .. once the decision
is made,
that this is a drug, ..., we do not go back and decide whether this really is a
device after all, and whether it should be in the category of the other substances.
We could have but we did not. The sponsor could ask us to and we would always
do that again. .. We are considering the N2 Universal today as a drug because
the sponsor wants to make the new drug claim that N2 disinfectsA'
Much of the problem with this NDA can be traced to the fact that no other
root canal ller has ever been required to go through the drug approval process.
Even dental materials containing known hazardous materials such as mercury
are regulated as Class I or H medical devices.42 Thus, there are no standard
protocols for the clinical study of dental ller drugs, and N2 Products was the
unwitting victim of FDA' s inexperience in this area.
Section 201(g) of the FD&C Act denes drug, inter alia, as (1)(C) articles
(other than food) intended to aect the structure or any function of the body
of man or other animals. Section 201(h) denes device, inter alia, as:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in
vitro reagent or other similar or related article, including any component, part
or accessory, which is ... (3) intended to aect the structure or function of the
38The Grey Sheet, FDC REPORTS, Aug. 17, 1987.
39Hearing Transcript at 41 (statement by Dr. Carolyn Tylenda, Exec-
utive Secretary, FDA Dental Products Panel).
~Hea ring Transcript at 129-131(statement by Ms. May Edwards,
Dental Products Panel, Industry Representative).
4'Hearing Transcript at 132-133.
42The Gray Sheet, FDC REPORTS, Aug. 17, 1987.
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body of man or other animals and which does not achieve its primary in-
tended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man. ..
and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its
primary intended purposes.
N2 is not clearly within one or the other of these denitions. FDA's posi-
tion appears to be that disinfecting means it is a drug. However, disinfection
contained within a root canal is not clearly a chemical action within the body,
and N2 is certainly not metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended
purpose. Given that other materials, such as root canal resins containing chlo-
roforms, also disinfect and are classied as devices, it is disingenuous to claim
that the disinfectant claim automatically makes it a drug. Normally, FDA clas-
sies grey area medical products{those which are not clearly a drug or device{as
devices rather than drugs.43 Thus, it remains unclear why N2 is being regulated
as a drug, unless it is because the manufacturer prefers drug status.
In fact, N2 Products does have something to gain by achieving new drug
approval for N2. N2 Products holds a patent on N2 and thus stands to benet
nancially. In addition, a major concern of the dentists using N2 is that they
will face malpractice liability for using a non-FDA approved substance or that
state boards of dentistry will ban the use of paraformaldehyde containing resins,
based upon pressure from the specialists. However, malpractice liability could
conceivably be reduced by requesting, as Dr. Botstein suggested, supra, that
N2 be considered a device rather than a drug. This would eliminate the need
to go through the extensive pre-marketing testing required for new drugs. On
the other hand, switching to device status may not be as easy as Dr. Botstein
implied. The FDA may not be willing to risk the public outcry if it allows N2 to
be used as a device and someone is harmed, given that it has decided that there
is insucient evidence to conclude it is safe and eective as a drug. Finally,
FDA approval of N2 as a drug would ensure dentists that the substance would
not be banned by the states in which they practice, since a state has never
banned the use of an FDA approved drug.
'~3Hutt casebook at 733.
~State boards of dentistry in California, Ohio, Florida, Missoun
and Maryland have considered bans on the use of
paraformaldehyde containing resins. No board has yet adopted a ban.
$~ Hearing Thanscript at 55 and 111.
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Practically, the current controversy and delayed NDA has had little eect
on dentists who wish to use N2 Universal. In general, the FD&C Act is limited
to acts which occur in inter-state commerce. Thus, FDA has allowed N2 to
be used by dentists if they get it by prescription from intrastate pharmacists.
While it may not be sold across state lines, it is essentially available for use by
any dentist, any where. The fact that FDA allows this, however, is inconsistent
and brings into question its sincerity in either (1) its belief that the product is
unsafe for use or (2) its contention that the FDA' s only concern is public health
and safety. If FDA is convinced that the product is safe enough to allow this
intra-state commerce exception, then it should either regulate N2 as a Class I
or II medical device or approve the NDA. If it is not, and it truly is concerned
about public health and safety, then it should not shirk its responsibilities to
the public by allowing this kind of use to continue.
Conclusion
Congress and the courts have given the FDA unprecedented discretion to
make decisions regarding the safety and eectiveness of new drugs. This reects
a judgment that FDA regulators should have the exibility to make close-call
decisions based upon agency expertise and to adopt creative approaches to com-
plex situations without being second-guessed by the judiciary. This decision is
not without costs. Without the oversight of judicial review, the agency is likely
to skimp on the requirements of due process, and the potential for agency cap-
ture by special interests increases. The American people who come into contact
with the process sense that it is undemocratic{that they have no where to go
when they feel they have been unfairly treated. In the case of N2 Universal,
a neutral judge would be better equipped to determine if the concern over the
product's safety and eectiveness is based upon science or politics. Yet, years
of judicial deference to FDA decisions have virtually eliminated this possibil-
ity, and thousands of American dentists now feel that they have been treated
unfairly.
Fairness and public safety should not be at odds. FDA should strive to
remember the responsibility it has to uphold standards of professionalism and
due process, as well as its responsibility to protect public safety. Its failure to
do so in this case has resulted in not only a loss of
18803-8543-9
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condence in the Agency by a large group of health care practitioners but
also the delay of a potentially very eective and inexpensive dental treatment.
19Daubert v. Merrell Dgw Missed OPPortunity
by
Kimberly Jackson
20I. Introduction
In 1923 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia estab-
lished a standard for the admission of scientic evidence inFrye v. United States.1
Novel scientic evidence was found to be admissible only if the un-
derlying scientic principle or discovery is suciently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular eld in which it
belongs.2 The continued validity of this test was called into question
when the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) were passed.3 The Cir-
cuits were split over whether the Frye test had been superseded.4 In
order to resolve the questions on the admission of scientic evidence,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hearDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc..5
1 923 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2 id... at 1014.
~ Public Law 93-596, 28 U.S.C. 2076. The two main rules are FRE
702 and FRE 703. FRE 702 Testimony by Experts: If scientic, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise. FRE
703 Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts: The facts or data in
the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or in-
ference may be those by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular eld in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,
the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
~ Three circuits held that Frye did not survive the enactment of the
FRE: 1J.ni.t~ States v. Jakobetz. 955 F.2d 786, 794-97 (2d. Cir.), ~
955 F.2d 786 (1992); Deluca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc.,
911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d. Cir. 1990); United States v. BaIler, 519
F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), Q~L..d~ni~d 423 u.s.
1019 (1975). Six Circuits found that Frye did survive including the
Ninth Circuit's decision in~iJ~~r.i: Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp.,
939 F2d. 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), L.d~ni~d,
112 5. Ct. 1280 (1991);.LlnhLe~ States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56,
60 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted, vacated, 925 F.2d 1127
(8th Cir. 1991) (en banc); United States v. Smith, 869 F2d 348, 351
(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-61 (D.C.
Cir.), ~LL d.enje~, 484 U.S. 817 (1987); United States v. Metzger,
778 F.2d 1195, 1203 (6th Cir. 1985), ~fL..d~ni~a, 477 U.S. 906
(1986).
~ 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
1
21Daubert v. Merrell Dow was one of many product liability cases
brought against the the manufacturer of Bendectin, an antinausea
drug alleged to cause birth defects. The extensive litigation even-
tually caused the product to be pulled from the market in 1983. In
order to prove causation, the cases focused on scientic evidence.
Merrell Dow emphasized that more than 30 published studies in-
volving 130,000 patients did not nd any statistically signicant as-
sociations between Bendectin and the sort of birth defects at
issue in D..au..b..~it. To support their position, the plaintis re-
lied on animal cells studies (in vitro studies), animal studies (in vivo
studies), chemical analysis of Bendectin and other substances that
are alleged to be teratogens, and reanalysis of certain published epi-
demiological studies.6 Five Circuits ruled that as a matter of law the
plaintis' evidence was insucient.7
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, the issue was presented as whether
the Frye rule of general acceptance had survived the enactment of
the FRE that pertain to the admission of expert evidence. Plaintis'
co-counsel Mary Gillick speculated that the court granted certiorari
for this case rather than for the previous bendectin cases because of
the explicit presentation of the continued validity of the Frye test.8
In their brief, the plaintis asked the court to decide whether, in
light of the FRE, federal courts may apply the Frye rule and hold
~ Brief for the Respondent, D~au~iI (No. 92-102).
~ Daubert v.Merrell Dow, 951F.2d1128 (9thCir.); Turpin v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals. Inc. 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.), ~ 113 5. Ct. 84
(1992);
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5thCir.
1989);
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell. Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
Q~L~ai~
493 U.S. 882 (1989); Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 830 F.2d 1190
(1st Cir. 1987).
8 Product Liability Daily (BNA) October 20, 1992.
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22expert scientic testimony inadmissible if it has not attained general
acceptance in the relevant scientic eld. They also questioned, if
the Frye test were applicable, whether it required publication in a
peer-reviewed journal. They argued that Frye cannot stand as a
judge-made rule of evidence independent of the FRE.~
The defendant, Merrell Dow, asked the court to decide that the
FRE required expert scientic testimony to have an adequate
foundation based on accepted scientic standards and processes for
validating scientic claims. They argued that the plaintis incor-
rectly contended that FRE 702 only imposes two requirements for
admissibility: a general determination that the expert's specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact and a
determination that the witness is a qualied expert in the eld.
The defendant argued that judges must determine both relevancy
and adequate foundation for evidence.10
The potential importance of the ~jj~.rj case was recognized by the
legal community as demonstrated by the ling of twenty-two ami-
cus briefs by organizations such as the Pharmaceutical Manufactur-
ers Association, American College of Legal Medicine, the American
Medical Association, the American Tort Reform
Association, and the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technol-
ogy, and Government.
~ Brief for Petitioner, ~.auke~I (No. 92-102). 10 Brief
for Respondent, D.a.u.~.rI (No. 92-1 02).
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23II. The Decision
On June 28, 1993, Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for
the Supreme Court which held for the plaintis by vacating the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanding the case. The
Supreme Court unanimously found that the Frye test of general
acceptance had been superseded by the FRE. The opinion stated
that nothing in the text of FRE 702 which governs expert testimony
establishes general acceptance as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.'1
Justice Blackmun stated that the defendant did not present any
clear indication that the FRE were intended to incorporate a gen-
eral acceptance standard. On the contrary, the decision stated that
the rigid general acceptance standard would be at odds with the
liberal thrust of the FRE and its general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony.1 2
Six other justices joined Justice Blackmun in emphasizing that
while the Frye test was superseded by the FRE, the admissibility
of purportedly scientic evidence still has limits. FRE 702 provides
most of the guidance for the admission of scientic evidence. It
requires that the subject of an expert's testimony must be scientic
... knowledge.'3 In the opinion, scientic was interpreted to imply
a grounding in the methods and procedures of science.14 Justice
Blackmun stated that the word knowledge
~'Daubert v.Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786,
2794 (1993).
12 td.~ at 2794 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S.
153,169 (1988)).
13 Id... at 2795.
'4 Id...
4
24indicates more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.' 5
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, arguably, there are no cer-
tainties in science but that in order to qualify as 'scientic knowl-
edge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientic
method.'6 The requirement that an expert's testimony be about sci-
entic knowledge established a standard of reliability. In a footnote,
the Court explained that in a case involving scientic evidence, ev-
identiary reliability will be based upon scientic validity.' 7
Justice Blackmun's opinion stated that the relevance component
of FRE 702 is found in the phrase that requires that the testimony
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue.'8 He wrote that Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard
requires a valid scientic connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility.' ~
According to this opinion, a trial judge, pursuant to FRE 104(a).20
must determine whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
scientic knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand or determine a fact in issue.21 The Court determined that this
requires a preliminary assessment of whether
15j~
~ Id... at n.9.
18 Id... at 2795.
19 id...at 2796.
20 FRE 104(a) states: Preliminary questions concerning the qual-
ication of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissi-
bility of evidence
shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of sub-
division(b).
Relevancy conditioned on fact.] In making its determination it is
not bound by the
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
21 113 S.Ct. at 2796.
5
25the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scienti-
cally valid and whether that reasoning or methodology can properly
be applied to the fact in issue.22
Justice Blackmun's opinion explicitly stated that it did not pre-
sume to set out a denitive checklist for the factors that will bear
on the inquiry.23 However, he made four general observations.
The opinion explained that whether the theory or technique can
be tested will ordinarily help determine scientic knowledge.24 Jus-
tice Blackmun wrote that whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication is another pertinent consideration.25
He also recommended that the court consider the known or potential
rate of error.28 Finally, he explicitly stated that general acceptance
can have a bearing on the inquiry.27
Justice Blackmun's opinion did not exclusively rely on FRE 702
for the admission of scientic evidence. He also cited FRE 703 which
establishes that expert opinions that are based on otherwise
inadmissible hearsay are only to be admitted if the facts or data
are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular eld
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.28 In addition, the
opinion emphasized that FRE 403 permits the exclusion of oth-
erwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or
22
24
25 Id... at 2797.
27j~
28 Id... at 2798.
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26misleading the jury .... ~ The Supreme Court's opinion also high-
lighted the judge's power to determine that the evidence is insuf-
cient and to use either the summary judgment or the directed
verdict.30
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a partial dissent even though he
agreed with the majority about the status of the Frye test. He
stated that the general observations are not only general but vague
and abstract.3' Chief Justice Rehnquist cautioned that the scientic
nature of the subject matter should cause the court to be careful
when deciding more than necessary because our reach can so easily
exceed our grasp.32 In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted
sections of the majority opinion that attempted to dene scientic
knowledge and lamented that Questions arise simply from reading
this part of the Court's opinion, and countless more questions will
surely arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its teach-
ing. ..
Ill. Analysis
The ambiguity surrounding the denition of scientic knowledge
and other related terms may partially explain why the attorneys for
Merrell Dow and those for the plaintis are declaring victory. While
it is not unusual for neither side to want to concede
29~
30~
l.d.1. at 2799. (Rhenquist, C.J., dissenting).
32~
Id... at 2800.
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27defeat, both sides appear to have signicant reasons to claim tri-
umph.
Plaintis' attorney, Barry Nace, called the P.a.l.Lb.~!i opinion a
total victory. He stated that the court said if you put together the
right kind of experts, you have a fact question for the jury. He said,
This Supreme Court has rearmed that juries can decide these
issues. 34
David Shapiro, who was also an attorney for the plaintis, stated
that the decision was a victory for the plaintis if only on the most
simple basis { the Court of Appeals decision was vacated and the
case was remanded. An armation would have been a
denite defeat. Mr. Shapiro added that while the decision was a
victory, it was far less than they had hoped for. He explained that
from their standpoint the ultimate decision would have been that
FRE 702 requires only two questions to be answered armatively
for evidence to get to a jury: rst, the jury needs expert help and,
second, the expert has the proper qualications and background to
be considered an expert. Mr. Shapiro stated that he believes this
reading of FRE was supported by Chief Justice Rehnquist.35
Merrell Dow's attorneys are also claiming victory. Charles Fried,
an attorney for the defendant, disagreed with people who say that
they lost because the Frye rule was not upheld. He emphasized
that they did not make an eort to save the Frye rule. Mr. Fried
explained that the outcome was a large, but admittedly
~' Supreme Court: 'General Acceptance' Theory of Evidence No Longer Good Law.
Supreme Court Rules BNA Prod. Liab. Daily, June 29, 1993, at
1.
~ Interview with David Shapiro, Professor, Harvard Law
School, Feb. 10, 1994.
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28indeterminate, role for the judge. He stated that the plaintis did
not achieve their goal of a standard that got the evidence to the jury.
The decision gives judges a role as gatekeeper and, consequently, the
ability to keep the evidence from the jury. Mr. Fried said that the
defense bar's dream was for a mechanical rule that would prevent
the jury from hearing evidence, but that this was also not realized.36
David Bernstein and Peter Huber37 agree that the defendants
were successful in their ultimate goal. They wrote The Bendectin
Plaintis won a narrow technical battle in D.ilJ~.~Lt, but they
plainly lost the war. They believe that on remand, the district judge
will apply the standard articulated by the Supreme Court and once
again exclude the evidence. Even if the judge admits the evidence,
Bernstein and Huber predict that he will use either summary judg-
ment or directed verdict to resolve the case for the defense. They
also believe that the Ninth Circuit would use the Daubert decision
to overturn a district decision for the plaintis in this case 38
While both sides claim victory in Daubert. the decision may not
have changed the way courts will analyze the admission of scientic
evidence. When commenting upon the opinion, Richard Meserve39
stated that the real test is how the lower courts apply
36 Interview with Charles Fried, Professor, Harvard Law School,
Feb. 10, 1994.
~ David Bernstein is an associate specializing in scientic
and product liability
litigation at Crowell & Moring in Washington, D.C. Peter W.
Huber is a Senior Fellow
at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research and author ofGalileo's
Revenae: Junk
Science in the Courtroom (Basic Books 1991)~
38 David Bernstein and Peter W. Huber, Defense Perspective
(1993) (on le with
author).
39 Richard Meserve is a partner at Covington & Burling in Wash-
ington, D.C. He was a
member of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and
Government that led
an amicus curiae brief in support of neither party.
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29the decision. He said that he did not think that Daubert changed
that
much because most courts are not applying, rigid single factor
tests.40 David Vladek4' also stated that he does not think that the
case changed anything. He does not believe that ~ will restructure
the way district judges assess the admission of scientic evidence be-
cause the criteria outlined by the court were not new. He gave peer
review as an example of a consideration that courts were already
using.42
In order to determine whetherD.aij.k.irt. has signicantly changed
the way judges assess the admission of scientic evidence
in food and drug product liability cases, I examined food and
drug product liabilities cases that involved the admission of scientic
evidence that were decided in the ten years preceding Daubert.43
40 Telephone interview with Richard Meserve, partner at Cov-
ington & Burling, (July
26, 1993).
41 David Vladek is an attorney with Public Citizen. He worked
with Ken Chesebro and other attorneys for the plainti.
42 Telephone interview with David Vladik, attorney with Public
Citizen (July 19,
1993).
4~ I have purposely excluded all other Bendectin cases from my
analysis. I excluded them because of the presumption that ~ub~.ri
is representative of the Bendectin litigation and because it was the
one that the Supreme Court decided to hear. If further analysis of
the other Bendectin cases is desired, they are examined in detail in
both the Petitioners and Respondents Briefs to the Supreme Court.
Aside from the Bendectin cases. I have analyzed other food and
drug product liability cases that focused on the admission of scien-
tic evidence as found through Westlaw searches. The following list
is of other cases that I found and why I did not include them in this
discussion: Worsham v. A.H. Robins, 734 F.2d 676 (11th Cir. 1984)
(questioning whether expert testimony is required to show manufac-
turer failed to meet the standard of care); Mazur v.Merck & Co., 742
F. Supp.. 239 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (reserving judgment on the motion
to exclude plainti's expert testimony and partial summary judg-
ment); Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corporation, 788 F.2d 741 (11th
Cir. 1986) (questioning whether the nding that plainti proved
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that manufacturer's
spermicide caused birth defects was clearly erroneous); Marder v.
G.D. Searle and Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087 (D.Md. 1986) (questioning
whether the evidence was sucient to establish causation. The evi-
dence had already been admitted. The court said that it could have
been denied
3010
31I looked at the cases decided prior to D.au.k.~t to determine whether
there were any patterns in the reasoning of the courts. I discovered
that the analysis of the judges could be classied into
three categories which I will call a qualied expert and helpful-
ness test, a balancing test with an emphasis on methodology, and a
modied general acceptance test.
I examined the ~ opinion to determine whether the
Supreme Court adopted any, or all, of these approaches. I found
that even if the Supreme Court did not explicitly intend to incorpo-
rate these tests into the opinion, support for all three of these tests
can be found.
My next step was to look at cases that rely on D.au.~iI to
determine if these three approaches are still being used. I found
that they are and, consequently, conclude that Daubert did not
signicantly change the standard used by courts for the admission
of scientic evidence.44
While I focus exclusively on food and drug product liability cases
that were decided before Daubert, my conclusions are probably ap-
plicable to other areas of novel scientic evidence that could have
been decided by the Frye test. My analysis may not be relevant to
cases in which the D~ir1 opinion has been extended to cover
admission but the lower court decided to let the evidence in.
Therefore, the analysis is dierent from a strict admissibility ques-
tion.) wheelahan v. G.D. Searle and Co., 814 F.2d 655, 1987 WL
267679 (4th Cir. 1990) (appealing from previously listed case);
Livshits v.Natural Y Surgical Specialities, 1991 WL 261770 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (questioning whether it was an error to allow the doctor to testify
as an expert on some questions. Because the testimony was already
admitted, the analysis is
dierent.)
44 The cases that I have examined for how ~ has been interpreted
are not about food and drug product liability because of the limited
number of post-~iu~rI cases.
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32experts that did not t within the realm of Frye's scientic evidence
such as an accountant and an accidentologist.45
A. Qualied Expert and Helpfulness Test
Under the qualied expert and helpfulness test, when a court ex-
amines the admissibility of scientic evidence, part of the analysis
focuses on the qualications of the expert to testify on a particu-
lar issue. In the second step of the analysis, the court determines
whether the expert's testimony will assist the trier of fact. If an ex-
pert's proposed testimony meets both of these criteria, it has been
found to be relevant. Before the D.ajj~j~j decision, the courts relied
on both case law and FRE 702 to support this approach.
1. Pre-Daubert
In Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories.48 an infant plainti brought a
personal injury suit alleging that the defendant's DTP vaccine
caused a stroke. The defendant oered the testimony of a doctor
who asserted that the infant suered the stroke before the vaccine
was administered. The District Court excluded the evidence be-
cause it believed that any expert who testied about the causation
had to be familiar with the working, nature, and medical literature
concerning endotoxins.47
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision to ex-
clude this testimony. The Tenth Circuit relied on Bridger v. Union
~.e Rorie Sherman, 'Junk Science' Rule Used Broadly. NATL
L.J., October 4, 1993, at 3.
46 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990).
Id.1. at 1407.
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33Railway Co. ~48 to nd that, in order to be admitted, the oered
evidence must be closely related to a particular profession, business
or science and not within the common knowledge of the average
layman. The witness must have
such skill, experience or knowledge in that particular eld as to
make it appear that his opinion would rest on substantial foundation
and would tend to aid the trier of fact in his search for truth.49
This language closely parallels that of FRE 702.
In this case, the court determined that there was no doubt that
scientic evidence was needed to resolve critical issues that were
beyond the knowledge of the average layman. Therefore, the issue
was whether the doctor was qualied to give testimony about when
the stroke occurred. In order to make this determination, the court
looked at the doctor's experience as a pediatric opthamologist with
training in neurology as it relates to the eye and the doctor's contact
with the plainti as a treating physician.50
The plainti in Amato v. Syntex Laboratories. Inc.51 brought an
action alleging that her daughter's mental deciencies were caused
by defendant's defective Neo-MulI-Soy formula. Summary judgment
was granted and armed because the courts found that plainti's
experts were not qualied to testify on the issue of causation and,
consequently, failed to establish a question of material fact.
48 355 R2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966).
~ 906 F.2d at 1407.
~ No. 89-2348, 1990 WL 163941 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 1990).
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34The Sixth Circuit cited FRE 702 for the proposition that the prof-
fered witness must be qualied as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education.52 They cited Manning v.
International Mfg. Co.,53 for the argument that in order to de-
termine an expert's qualications, the court must investigate the
competence of the witness and whether the expert would aid the
trier of fact.5 ~
The court determined that plainti's witnesses did not meet this
standard because the experts' own testimony revealed that they
were not qualied to give expert opinions about causation. Neither
of the witnesses had conducted an examination of the child nor were
they aware of the child's condition. This led the court to con-
clude that the experts could not provide competent testimony about
medical causation and, therefore, would not be able to provide the
fact nder with assistance on this issue.55
In Payton v. Abbott Labs,56 the plainti brought a negligence
action against a manufacturer of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES)
alleging that she was injured in utero. The defendants challenged
the District Court's decision to admit the testimony of two of the
plainti's expert witnesses on the issue of causation. The defense
argued that the doctors were not qualied because they were
clinicians, not research scientists. They argued that without
52 Id... at *2.
~ 650 F. 2d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 1981).
~ 1990 WL 163941, *3~ 55Id~
56 780 F. 2d 147 (1st Cir. 1985).
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35specialized knowledge of the research-type causation question at is-
sue, neither doctor should have been allowed to testify.57
The First Circuit agreed with the defense that FRE 702 requires
an expert to possess specialized knowledge of the eld in which he
purports to be an expert. The court cited FRE 702 for the proposi-
tion that if scientic knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a qualied expert
may testify.58
In this case, the court emphasized that the oered doctors were
qualied experts in the eld of medicine and that teratology is part
of the eld of medicine. Therefore, the First Circuit disagreed with
the defense and decided that the doctors should be allowed to testify
without any more specialized knowledge. The court explained that
the degree of expertise should inuence the weight that the jury may
place upon testimony, rather than determine the admissibility.59
In Smith v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation,60 the plaintis
brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of vagi-
nal spermicide seeking recovery for a child who was born with a
genetic or chromosomal abnormality. The defendant moved to pre-
clude the testimony of plaintis' proposed causation experts because
the type of data that they used was not reasonably relied upon by
experts in determining the cause of birth defects.
57 Id... at 155.
58~
59j~
60 770 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
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36The District Court explicitly used a two-step test based upon FRE
702 to determine the relevance of the proposed experts' testimony.
They stated,
Rule 702 thus contains two prerequisites to the admissibility of
expert testimony: Appropriate expertise on the part of the witness
and helpfulness of the expert opinion to the trier of fact.6 1
In order to analyze the meaning of these requirements, the Dis-
trict Court looked to precedent for assistance. The court looked at
other circuits becuase it did not nd any relevant cases in its own
jurisdiction. The District Court cited ~aaoiaQ. for the position that
the expert need only be able to aid the jury in resolving a relevant
issue.62 The decision held that an expert must have the education
and experience necessary to have knowledge of the subject mat-
ter, but that he need not have complete knowledge about the eld.
Therefore, the court decided that the proered doctors qualied as
experts under FRE 702 even though they were not specialists in the
relevant eld. The court also found that the testimony would assist
the jury. Therefore, the doctor's testimony was determined to be
relevant.63
In Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories. Inc.,64 plainti brought an
action against adrug manufacturer whose ibuprofen allegedly caused
renal failure. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment
61 j~ at 1566.
62 Id... (citing 650 F.2d 864, 850).
63 770 F. Supp. at 1568.
64 791 F. Supp. 1335 (S.D. md. 1992).
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3765 Id... at 1345.
66 Id... at 1343.
67 113 U.S. at 2796.
arguing that the opinions of the experts were inadmissible be-
cause they were unsupported.
In this case, the District Court did not focus extensively on the
qualications of the witnesses. Instead, the court was more con-
cerned with the scientic basis of the opinions. The court empha-
sized that even though an expert is qualied, it does not mean that
the opinion has sucient scientic basis.65 The District Court stated
that FRE 702 requires the court to determine if the expert is qual-
ied and if his testimony will assist the trier of fact. The Porter
court found that this requirement mandates an examination of the
foundation of the opinion.66
2. Daubert Decision
The reasoning applied in these lower court decision closely re-
sembles parts of the ~ decision. The qualied expert and helpful-
ness standard can be found in several places within the Supreme
Court's opinion. The qualications of the expert were addressed in
the opinion when Justice Blackmun analyzed what constituted sci-
entic knowledge in FRE 702. Justice Blackmun also emphasized
that FRE 702 requires that the evidence or testimony must assist
the trier of fact. He called this FRE 702's helpfulness standard and
stated that it required a valid scientic connection to the pertinent
inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.67
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38Additionally, the Daubert opinion explicitly outlined a two-step ad-
missibility test for scientic evidence when it stated,
Faced with a proer of expert scientic testimony, then, the trial
judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a) whether
the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientic knowledge that (2)
will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue.68
In this passage, Justice Blackmun provided lower courts with an
interpretation of 104(a) that they have used, along with the analy-
sis of FRE 702, to employ a two-step qualication and helpfulness
standard to determine relevance in their analysis of the admissibility
of scientic evidence.
3. Post-Daubert
The courts in bothLiu v. Yin Chine Lieu69 andUnited States v. Martinez70
relied on Justice Blackmun's interpretation of Rule 104(a) in their
determination of the admissibility of expert evidence. In Liu, the
court had to decide whether to allow a professional economist to
testify for the plainti. Defendant argued that the economist's pro-
jections were speculative and not helpful to the jury. The Southern
District of New York found that the two-step analysis of 'whether
the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientic knowledge that (2)
will assist the trier of fact' is applicable when the argument is made
that the expert does not have specialized knowledge and will not
help the jury even when the
68~
69 No. 84 Civ. 0690 (PNL), 1993 WL 478343 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 16, 1993).
70 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993).
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39evidence is not about novel scientic theories.71 In this case the court
found that some of the testimony consisted of professional, scientic
or technical knowledge within the meaning of Rule 702 that would
assist the jury.72 The witness was allowed to testify on those matters.
United States v. Martinez questioned the admissibility of DNA
evidence. As part of its analysis, the court stated,
Before admitting scientic expert testimony, the court must con-
clude, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) that the pro-
posed testimony constitutes (a) scientic knowledge that (2) will
assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.73
The Martinez court also focused on FRE 702's requirement that
expert testimony must assist the trier of fact.74
The determination of an expert's qualications and helpfulness is
a test that was utilized by lower courts to determine relevancy before
the Supreme Court decided ~ The D.au~it court did not explicitly
state that they were adopting this standard that had been utilized
by the lower courts. However, the opinion contains passages that can
be read as supporting this test and the lower courts have continued
to utilize the approach. All that appears to have changed about this
test following Daubert is that the courts are now citing ~ as their
authority for the analysis.
~ 1993 WL 478343 at *1. (citing 113 S.Ct. at
2796).
72 1993 WL 47843 at *1
~ 3 F.3d at 1196. (citing 113 S.Ct. at 2794-2795). 74 3 F.3d at 1196.
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40B. Balancing Test with an EmDhasis on Methodology
When a court employs a balancing test to determine reliability,
it looks at a wide range of factors. The key to this test is that many
dierent issues are examined and weighed rather than a mechanical
test in which the expert testimony must meet a bright line rule.75
Under a balancing approach, courts typically scrutinize the expert's
background, the data he uses, the practice of his peers, and the
publications on the topic in addition to other factors. A standard
theme of this approach is an emphasis on methodology. However,
rarely is methodology strictly dened. This is probably deliberate.
If methodology is left ambiguous, the court can adjust its require-
ments on a case by case basis. For example, epidemiology may be
crucial in making some causation determinations, but may not be
the standard practice in other elds. Similarly, extensive data may
be available for some topics, but not for others. Therefore, a reliance
on methodology allows the courts to adjust their requirements. But
this also means that decisions can seem to be inconsistent and un-
predictable due to the malleable nature of the standard.
1. Pre-Daubert
In Smith v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation,76 the court de-
cided that the experts' testimony was relevant under FRE 702 be-
cause the witnesses were qualied as experts and their testimony
~ The Frye general acceptance test is a mechanical rule. The
balancing approach
for the admission of scientic evidence is usually a direct rejection
of the rigidness of
this rule.
76 770 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
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41could assist the trier of fact. However, the court found that this was
not enough. The District Court held that FRE 703's requirement
that the evidence be of the kind reasonably relied upon by experts
in his or her eld mandates that the court examine the reliability of
the expert's sources.77 The court stated.
the court has a responsibility to make an independent determi-
nation of whether the basis for an expert's opinion meets minimum
standards of reliability.78
In order to make this determination, the District Court debated
whether to employ the Frye test or the balancing test utilized by
some other circuits. The court decided to use a balancing test in
which
the evaluation of novel scientic evidence involves a balancing
of relevance, reliability and helpfulness of the evidence against the
likelihood of waste of time, confusion and prejudice.79
The District Court found that admissibility depended upon the
reliability of the genetic and epidemiological data and the experts'
ability to evaluate that data properly.80 The experts' testimony was
carefully analyzed in terms of methodology and what other experts
in the eld rely upon. The court scrutinized the studies that the
proered witnesses presented. The court found that one of the
Id... at 1569.
78
U.~.. at 1571.
80 Id... at 1573.
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42doctor's proposed testimony reected speculation and showed that
he was not familiar with basic principles used to evaluate epidemio-
logical studies. This led to the conclusion that the basis of his tes-
timony was not the type that experts reasonably use to determine
birth defects. His testimony was not admitted.8' The court's cri-
tique of the other doctor was not more positive. Both experts were
criticized for not considering relevant epidemiologic studies and the
other possible causes of disease. After a detailed examination of the
methodological basis of the experts' testimony, the court explained
that a consensus is not a prerequisite for admissibility, but some
reliable basis for the expert's opinion is necessary.82
In Payton v. Abbott Labs83 the defense challenged the admissi-
bility of the plainti's experts asserting that they could point to no
facts or data ... of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular eld in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject
as required by FRE 7Q3~84 The First Circuit determined that it did
not matter that neither of the proered doctors had done system-
atic research in the specialized area. The court found many reasons
why the doctors' basis for their opinions were sucient including:
the topic had been covered in medical school; the doctors had stud-
ied some of the articles published regarding DES and embryology;
the doctors had attended lectures on the topic; they discussed the
subject with researchers in the eld; and they had
81 Id... at 1580.
82~
83 780 F. 2d 147 (1st Cir. 1985).
84 Id... at 156.
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43both treated numerous DES-exposed women and their daughters
in addition to the plainti. The court weighed these factors and
concluded that the doctors' testimony was reliable enough to allow
them to testify. The court was not concerned that the defendant was
able to undercut some of the foundation of the doctors' opinions.
The court found that weak factual underpinnings should aect the
credibility of their testimony, rather than the admissibility.85
InPorter v. Whitehall Laboratories. Inc.,86 the District Court in-
terpreted FRE 703 to require that an expert may only rely on ev-
idence on which a reasonable expert in the eld would rely.87 The
court explained that in order to determine whether the particular
fact or data known about the particular case is the type reasonably
relied on by experts, the court must consider the methods used to
arrive at the conclusions. This means that
the reasons, basis, method, or major premise of an expert's opin-
ion must have scientic support beyond the testifying expert's own
hypothesis; there must be some data or established paradigm that
provides the reasonablyreliEablel reference point for the minor premise
and ultimate opinion.88
In this case, the court found that the experts based their opinions
primarily upon a temporal relationship and were not familiar with
the relevant medical eld. Therefore, the court balanced the extent
to which the opinion might be probative versus the possible
86 791 F. Supp. 1335 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
87 Id... at 1343. (citing United States v. Lundy, 809 F.2d 392, 395
(7th Cir. 1987)).
88 791 F. Supp. at 1344.
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4489 Id... at 1355.
90 113$. Ct. at 2797.
prejudicial eect and decided that, because the jury might be
swayed by the opinions of experts, the opinion must have some basis
other than hypothesis.89
2. Daubert Decision
When the Supreme Court held that the Frye rule had been su-
perseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, they chose not to replace
it with another mechanical rule. Instead, they instituted a balanc-
ing test. Justice Blackmun wrote that many factors will bear on
the decision whether the reasoning and methodology of an expert
is acceptable and, hence, admissible. He explicitly stated that he
did not want to set out a denitive checklist or test. He labeled his
four criteria as general observations. The rst is whether the theory
or technique has been tested. The second is whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Third,
the courts are instructed to look at the known or potential rate of
error. Finally, Justice Blackmun stated that general acceptance can
still have an impact on admissibility. After stating these general
guidelines, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the inquiry should be
a exible one that focuses on methodology, not conclusions.90 The
test endorsed by the Dau.kQJt opinion is a balancing one focusing
on methodology rather than a mechanical rule.
24
453. Post-Daubert
The cases that have been decided shortly after ~ indicate that the
criteria outlined by Justice Blackmun can be dicult to apply. The
courts have not used the factors in a uniform manner. Some have
viewed them more as requirements than guidelines. Other courts
have focused more on one factor to the exclusion of the others.
A few months after the D l.&~ri opinion, the Seventh Circuit
reviewed the District Court's decision to exclude expert testimony
in Porter. After a review of the D.iub~iI holding, the Circuit Court
wrote, The district court's approach anticipated Daubert's directive.91
The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the lower court's position that
an expert must be able to compare the data with a known scientic
conclusion or relationship. The District Court found that if experts
cannot tie their assessment of data to known scientic conclusions,
based on research or studies, the testimony is not helpful to the
jury.92 The Circuit Court also found that the District Court's anal-
ysis was consistent with the four criteria outlined by.~.au.b.irI. The
lower court did not explicitly use all four criteria because some of
them were not applicable to this case. For example, the lower court
noted that there was not published scientic data or evidence that
linked ibuprofen to RPGN. The District Court did not directly ad-
dress the general acceptance of the method used, but the experts
did not identify a method by which they
~ Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories. Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir.
1993). 92~
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46evaluated the data.93 The Circuit Court concluded that the lower
court had correctly excluded the evidence. They stated that while
the District Court did not apply the exact test set forth in ~ it
anticipated the Supreme Court's analysis well.94
In Martinez, the Eighth Circuit focused on Du.k~ii's methodol-
ogy requirements. The court quoted the passage in D.au~rI in which
Blackmun wrote that the subject of the scientic testimony does not
have to be known to a certainty, but it must be derived by the scien-
tic method.95 The Eighth Circuit then looked at the four critieria
outlined by Justice Blackmun and called them the non-exclusive
list of factors.96 In this case, the court found that the Second Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the techniques of DNA proling are reliable is
still valid under the D.u.~I standard.97 However, the Eighth Circuit
stated that this was not enough to admit the evidence. The court
found that Dau~si required more than just a nding of reliability of
a particular methodology. According to the Eighth Circuit, a trial
judge has the duty to determine whether the specic testimony of-
fered was derived from the application of a reliable methodology or
principle in the particular case.98
In another DNA case, the Sixth Circuit's focus was slightlydierent.99
The two circuits agreed that Justice Blackmun's list of four criteria
was a non-exclusive list of factors. The Sixth Circuit
~ Id... at 615.
~ J.d... at 616.
~ 3 F.3d at 1196 (citing 113 S.Ct. at 2795).
96 3F.3dat1197.
97Id~
98 3F.3d at 1198.
~ United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).
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47wrote that through this list, the Daubert Court began to draw the
parameters of scientic validity.'00 Instead of focusing on the ap-
plication of a reliable methodology, the Sixth Circuit emphasized
that courts are not to be concerned with the reliability of the con-
clusions generated by valid methods, principles and reasoning. In-
stead, the courts are only to determine whether the principles and
methodology underlying the testimony are valid.'0' While these two
approaches may be slightly dierent, the outcomes will probably be
the same.
The approach taken by the Fourth Circuit, however, may result
in dissimilar admissibility determinations. While other courts ap-
pear to have continued the trend of D.au.b.~I and pre-Daubert cases
of not explicitly dening the scientic method, the Fourth Circuit
dened it as subjecting testable hypotheses to the crucible of ex-
periment in an eort to disprove them.'02 In this case about expert
testimony regarding chromatographic analysis conducted on cocaine
samples, the court listed the four criteria and reiterated Daubert's
contention that the rule is exible. However, the Fourth Circuit
went beyond the guidelines to prescribe that An opinion that dees
testing, however defensible or deeply held, is not scientic.'03 There-
fore, despite the Daubert opinion listing testability as only one of
four factors that are not a denitive
100 Id... at 555.
,o1 Id...
102 tL&L~aam, 3 F.3d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1993)..
103
27
48checklist,104 the Fourth Circuit has made testability a requirement
for the admission of scientic evidence.'05
Before the ~ decision, several courts used a balancing approach
with an emphasis on methodology to evaluate scientic evidence in
food and drug product liability cases. .2a~j.~I solidied this ap-
proach through its strong emphasis on methodology and the four
criteria that Justice Blackmun listed as guidelines. The cases after
~ have continued the trend of weighing several factors when deciding
whether to admit scientic evidence. While the earlier cases often
used some or all of the criteria outlined in Daubert, the cases after
the Supreme Court decision usually at least mention all four. The
cases vary, however, to the degree that they emphasize one criteria
over the others. Sometimes this is the right approach because it al-
lows the court to tailor its evaluation to the individual facts. This is
probably what Justice Blackmun had in mind when he called these
criteria a guideline rather than a denitive checklist. In other cases,
however, the court appears either to use the Supreme Court's deci-
sion as an excuse to utilize a test that it wanted to use anyway or
they have simply interpreted the case dierently from other juris-
dictions. In any event, D.au.k.ir..t has provided a framework for the
balancing approach that many
104 113 S.Ct. at 2796.
1 05 Another way of looking at the Fourth Circuit's opinion is not that
it created an inexible single-criterion test, but that it adopted a denitional
threshold for science. Most scientists would agree that scientic principles can-
not be based on nontestable hypotheses. Propositions that are not testable may
or may not be true, but if they cannot be shown to be true, they cannot be relied
upon to determine facts. If ~ requires science, then a nontestable proposition
could not be admitted into evidence as support for an asserted fact. This analy-
sis that requires a scientic fact to be testable, detracts from Justice Blackmun's
listing of testablility as one of four items on a nondenitive checklist.
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49courts were already applying and the decision has accentuated an
emphasis on methodology.
C. Modied General Acceptance Test
The general acceptance test as outlined in Frye is rigid. The 1923
opinion stated,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be suciently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular eld
in which it belongs.'06
While this appears to be a mechanical rule, before D.ai~.~r.t some
courts were using a more malleable general acceptance test in food
and drug product liability. A general acceptance test is not exible
if the court merely focuses on whether the conclusion is generally
accepted in the scientic community. There is, of course, room to
adjust denitions of generally accepted and scientic community,
but the standard is dicult to manipulate. However, if the courts
focused not on the general acceptance of the conclusion, but purely
on the general acceptance of the methodology leading up to the con-
clusion, this allows more room for the court to decide to admit the
evidence. The exibility of the court is also increased when general
acceptance is seen as only one of many factors to be considered.
The inclusion of other factors such as publication and testing works
well in conjunction with the evaluation of general acceptance of the
methodology.
106 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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501. Pre-Daubert
The Sixth Circuit's position on general acceptance had already
changed before the D.a.u.kell opinion. The Sixth Circuit used to ex-
pound a test that required the proered theory to meet a general ac-
ceptance test as exemplied in Novak v. United States.'07 This case
was brought by a widow under the Federal Tort Claims Act and
Swine Flu Act. The plainti claimed her husband's death was a
result of the swine u vaccination.
When deciding whether testimony of the expert witnesses should
be allowed, the court explained that the testimony must conform
to 'generally accepted explanatory theory' accepted or recognized
by the relevant scientic or medical community.'08 The court con-
cluded that the experts' theories were not accepted. The rejection of
their articles for publication by three medical journals was cited as
support for this conclusion as was the lack of other objective med-
ical studies or reports supporting their position.'09 Consequently,
the testimony was rejected because of the lack of support for their
theory.
In Prince v. 3M Company,0 the Sixth Circuit used a less stringent
requirement when the court had to determine whether to admit
the evidence of an expert who wanted to testify about whether the
prosthesis that had been oered into evidence was the one that had
been removed from the plainti's leg.
107 865 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1989).
108 Id..~.at 722.
109 J.~at723.
110 No. 92-3036, 1992 WL 354034 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 1992).
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51The Sixth Circuit utilized a four-part test to determine the admis-
sibility of this evidence:
(1) a qualied expert (2) testifying on a proper subject
(3) which is in conformity to a generally accepted explanatorytheory
(4) the probative value of which outweighs its prejudicial eect.1"
The court used this four-part test to determine that the expert
did not meet the necessary criteria to be deemed a qualied ex-
pert. The evidence was also excluded because itfound that the test
employed by the doctor was not accepted within the scientic com-
munity.' 12 They did not criticize his conclusion, but rather the
method he used to arrive at his conclusion
The Sixth Circuit's emphasis on the general acceptance of method-
ology, rather than conclusions, was found in~Pharmaceutical Products. Inc.."3
In this case, the plainti argued that the defendant's drug aggra-
vated her myocarditis and was a substantial cause of her cardiomy-
opathy. The District Court denied the drug distributor's motion
for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial. The distributor appealed and
argued that the causation hypothesis of plainti's expert does not
have a generally accepted scientic basis. . 114
The Sixth Circuit used the same four-part test utilized inELio~.
Due to the claims made by the defendant, the court focused
111 Id... at *2 (citing Sterling v. velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d
1188, 1208 (6th
Cir. 1988)).
112 1992 WL 354034 at *2.
~3 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
"~ Id.1:at 531.
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52on the third element of the test which requires conformity to a gen-
erally accepted explanatory theory. The defendant argued that the
generally accepted criteria was not met because the expert did not
subject his view to peer review, that he presented no epidemiolog-
ical evidence, and that the treating physicians disagreed with his
theory.l '~
The Sixth Circuit examined the basis of the expert's opinion
including the published sources that he cited. The court concluded
that the expert's testimony was suciently plausible to allow a jury
to ground a verdict on it.116 The court found that the conclusion
did not have to be completely accepted. An alternative view based
on sound methodology that was generally accepted was sucient to
allow the evidence to go to a jury.
The Sixth Circuit was not alone in its endorsement of a general
acceptance requirement for the underlying methodology. The Fifth
Circuit employed a similar approach inOsburn v. Anchor Laboratories. Inc..'17
A suit was brought in this case against the manufacturer of veteri-
nary chloramphenicol. The user and spouse argued that the failure
to provide adequate warnings regarding the risk of fatal blood disor-
ders from the absorption of the drug was a producing and proximate
cause of the user's leukemia.
The manufacturer appealed the District Court decision on several
grounds including the insuciency of the causation evidence. The
defendant argued that the ideas of the plaintis' expert witnesses
116 id...at 534.
~ 825 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1987).
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53were not widely accepted in the medical eld and were, therefore,
insucient evidence of causation.
The Fifth Circuit explicitly stated, An expert's opinion need not
be generally accepted in the scientic community before it can be
suciently reliable and probative to support a jury nding.' 18 How-
ever, the court argued that it was necessary for the expert to arrive
at his opinion by relying upon methods that other experts in his eld
would reasonably rely upon in reaching their own, possibly dierent
conclusions.'19 While the conclusions do not need to be generally
accepted, the methodology must be. In this case, the court found
that the expert's methodologies were those that were generally relied
upon by other physicians in this area.'20
2. Daubert Decision
In Daubert, the Supreme Court eliminated the rigid Frye gen-
eral acceptance standard when they held that the Federal Rule of
Evidence superseded the common law test. However, general accep-
tance was not completely eliminated from the evaluation of expert
testimony because it is one of the four criteria listed by Justice
Blackmun in his guidelines. U.S. v. Downing'2' was cited for the
assertion that,
reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit,
explicit identication of a relevant scientic community and an ex-
press determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that
community.'22
118 Id~ at 915.
119
120 Id...at 916.
121 753 F.2d at 1238.
122 113 S.CI. at 2797.
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54This is not the only place in the opinion where an endorsement for
general acceptance can be found.
Justice Blackmun's strong focus on methodology and the deriva-
tion of scientic knowledge from the scientic method' 23 could be
interpreted as mandating that the methodology must be generally ac-
cepted by the relevant scientic community. While Justice Black-
mun does not require that the conclusions be deemed scientically
valid, he does mandate that reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony ... [be] scientically valid. .. .124 Justice Blackmun also
stated that the focus of the inquiry must be solely on the principles
and methodology, rather than the conclusions that they generate.'25
3. Post-Daubert
In Dodd-Anderson v. Stevens,126 the court used au~.ri to de-
termine whether the expert testimony about a dental examination
was correctly decided. The court evaluated that testimony in terms
of the criteria set out in Justice Blackmun's guidelines. The District
Court opinion examined the testimony and the underlying support
for the conclusion. The decision in the case hinged upon the court's
determination that Nearly every study provided by the defendants
shows that there is not a general acceptance of the connection. ..
127 Consequently, the evidence was excluded.
123 Id... at 2795.
124 Id... at 2796.
125 Id... at 2797.
126 Nos. 92-1015-MLB, 92-1016-MLB, 1994 wL 26922 (D. Kan. Jan. 5,
1994).
127 ii at 3.
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55132 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
adjust to the changes in scientic knoweldge can also be rigid
enough to mandate uniform application. I think that these two goals
are probably, to a great extent, mutually exclusive. However, this
is not to say that the Supreme Court could not have gone further
towards the goal of uniform results. While some of the lower courts
appear to be using all three of the tests that I have identied as
being part of the Dau.k&rt standard, more consistency may have
been achieved if the Supreme Court had outlined these requirements
more explicitly. The general acceptance test is part of the balancing
factors outlined in Justice Blackmun's general guidelines, but the
interpretation of FRE 1Q4 (a) that led to the qualied expert and
helpfulness standard is found in a dierent, and seemingly less re-
lated, part of the opinion. Justice Blackmun's guidelines could also
have been more concrete. While the Court probably wanted to al-
low substantial exibility, the criteria could have been outlined more
strongly. The factors would have been stronger both if they were a
non-exhaustive checklist of relevant factors rather than general ob-
servations and if they had been stated slightly more forcefully. For
example, Justice Blackmun wrote the fact of publication (or lack
thereof) in a peer-reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though
not dispositive, consideration. ... 132 The opinion could have required
that, if available, peer-reviewed articles on the topic must be consid-
ered. This would mandate examination of the articles but would not
be unduly prejudicial against new theories because it does not make
publication a prerequisite to admission. I favor requiring certain
factors to be
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considered, if they are available, without making them prerequi-
sites so that their lack of availability does not preclude admission. The
~ opinion does not do this because it allows the lower court judges to
decide individually which factors to consider.
In Daubert, Justice Blackmun was very tentative about the Court's exper-
tise inthe area of science, and Justice Rhenquist even more so. However,
the role of the judicial system is to apply laws to facts. In this case,
the Supreme Court refused to come to grips with the question of what
a fact is when the answer depends on science. This task was dele-
gated to individual judges in the form of vague standards. Justice
Blackmun realized that he placed signicant responsibility on the
lower court judges. He wrote, We are condent that federal judges
possess the capacity to undertake this review.133 Only time will tell
if the lower court judges are able to eectively make these determi-
nations thereby creating a workable, consistent standard or if the
Supreme Court should have given them more concrete guidance.
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